

To end on a historical footnote, the old puritanical Americans, the New Englanders of the 1820s and 1830s, were willing to withstand the strains of long ocean voyages on their China Clippers to make profits off the China trade. Chinese had no interest in making ocean-going junks to trade in the opposite direction. To this day, Chinese overseas trade heavily involves trading networks, the fabled Chinatowns around the world, and not lone entrepreneurs living among foreign populations. Americans seem more capable of doing this, as missionaries, and as technical experts, perhaps as intellectual expatriates, but they rarely want to live the same life style as the poor people they live among. If Americans actually had to live the same life style as a Mexican peon or a Chinese peasant, they'd rather stay in America. Likewise, the spread of religions like Buddhism among non-Asian immigrant Americans is more the result of the curiosity of Americans' actively searching for new ideologies than of missionary campaigns coming from China, because for all practical purposes, there weren't any.

8

Complicated Mourning and Mobilization for Nationalism

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The subject of this chapter is very much a challenge to the writer, as it may also be to the reader, since it requires several conceptual leaps and linkages. But if the presentation proves to be at all successful, it could contribute to a scientific theory about the psychology of peace making, which, while in great demand, is far from having been achieved.

We begin with the universal and obligatory phenomenon of mourning in individuals in the face of significant loss, most commonly of a loved one, and with the need to work through the loss through acceptance of it and reintegration into life processes through investment in another object of love. Special note is taken of the apparent connection between grieving, a basic component of the mourning process, and the sense of loss of an object vital to the individual's security and survival. We then move from the individual self to the concept of the group self, its origins and its manifestation as ethnos or nation, and then the idea of collective loss and the resultant large group mourning processes.

Analysis of various forms of psychological and physical assault by external forces on the group self or nation and of the concept of consequent narcissistic injury and related rage begins to move the discussion closer to the central topic of the chapter. We examine the psychology of victimhood and its consequences for political relationships, especially including mobilization for nationalism. There is a discussion of how nationalism becomes extreme and potentially violent.

Finally, there is brief reference to a theory of peace making as the reactivation of an interrupted mourning process. This deals with methods

of healing group narcissistic wounds through a specific political-psychological strategy. The approach is to enhance the environment for resolution of an ethnic or national political conflict through historic review of the relationship, acknowledgement of past injustices by the aggressors or their descendants, offers of contrition and, ideally, expressions of forgiveness by the victim group (Montville, 1993a). The practical consequence of the healing strategy is the reaffirmation (restoring the loss) of the value of the self-concept and self-esteem of the victimized group. Equally important is a commitment by each group or nation to a new relationship based on equity, justice, and mutual respect.

MOURNING: UNIVERSAL AND OBLIGATORY

In a prescient way, Freud ([1917] 1957) launched the discussion of the tie between mourning and nationalism, in his essay "Mourning and Melancholia," when he wrote that "mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country, liberty, and ideal, and so on" (p. 243). We will make more of this connection further on, but it is useful to note that other scholars, beyond psychoanalysts, have contributed important data to the understanding of the mourning process.

Biologists have described mourning in mammals, including cats, dogs and higher primates, and birds (but not reptiles, amphibians, and fish), which are of direct relevance to understanding the process in humans. Pollock (1961) offers a number of vignettes of animal grief including a heart-breaking story of a chimpanzee couple that had lived together for several months, were seldom apart, and usually had their arms around each other's neck. Quoting Brown (1879), Pollock writes:

After the death of the female . . . the remaining one made many attempts to rouse her, and when he found this to be impossible, his rage and grief were painful to witness. . . . The ordinary yell of rage which he set up at first, finally changed to a cry . . . never heard before . . . uttered somewhat under the breath, and with a plaintive sound like a moan. With this he made repeated efforts to arouse her, lifting up her head and hands, pushing her violently and rolling her over. (p. 357)

Bowlby (1961) cites Shand (1920) on the motivations present in situations evoking grief. The urge to regain the lost object persists long after reality rules out the possibility. In this view, the weeping and appeals for assistance to others carries an admission of weakness. Bowlby writes, "This appeal Shand regards, I believe rightly, as stemming from primitive

roots and as having survival value: 'the cry of sorrow . . . tends to preserve the life of the young by bringing those who watch over them to their assistance'" (p. 320). Another British theorist, Ian Suttie (1988), throws light on rage in the grieving process in his discussion of object relations. Suttie saw man as a social animal who seeks object (i.e., intimate human) relations from birth, as a creature with innate need for companionship. He wrote:

To my mind the most important aspect of mental development . . . is *the idea of others* and of one's own relationship to them. . . . Man [for Freud] is a bundle of energies seeking to dissipate themselves but restrained by fear. Against this I regard expression not as an outpouring for its own sake, but as an overture demanding response from others. *It is the absence of this response, I think, that is the source of all anxiety and rage whose expression is thus wholly purposive.* (Emphasis mine) (pp. 29–35)

Thus, anger, for Suttie, was not a simple response to frustration but rather an insistent demand for the help of others. It is the best way to *attract* attention, and it must be regarded as a protest against unloving behavior. We will return to the matter of grief and loss linked to survival anxiety.

For the purpose of this chapter we will adopt as a general definition of mourning the consensus found in the works by Freud, Pollock, Bowlby, and Volkan. This definition states that mourning connotes a set of psychological processes that are generated by the loss of a loved object and that usually lead to the letting go of the object. "Grief" is that set of affective states such as anger, anxiety, and despair that occur after the loss. Thus, one can anticipate a sequence beginning with shock, disbelief, angry efforts to recover the lost object, followed by disorganization, confusion and apathy, with some form, in the end, of acceptance of the loss, as well as emotional reorganization and reintegration at the end of a successful mourning process.

With the relinquishment of the lost object, there is a redirection of emotional investment into a new object, which, in Freud's terms, could also be an abstraction, like a new country, political entity, or political relationship. Failure to complete a mourning process, getting stuck somewhere in the process, with the consequent failure to adapt to the loss and find a way to get on with life, can be called complicated or incomplete mourning.

Two anecdotes—one animal, one human—illustrate in remarkable parallel an uncompleted mourning process arrested in the apathy/despair phase. Thomas Mann (1919), cited in Bowlby (1961), wrote of his

experience with Bashan, a male mongrel dog that he had acquired at the age of six months, who had a very strong attachment to him after two years. When Mann placed Bashan with a veterinarian for two weeks of observation, the dog withdrew from him emotionally. Mann wrote, "I was shocked by the sullen indifference with which he greeted my entrance and advance." After a third week with the vet, Mann went to take Bashan home. The dog "lay upon his side, stretched out in a posture of absolute indifference. . . . He was staring backwards . . . with eyes that were glassy and dull. . . . He merely kept staring at the whitewashed wall opposite" (p. 330).

The other story is of "Reggie," a young boy, reported in Burlingham and Freud (1942) and cited by Scheff and Retzinger (1991). Reggie was separated from his parents at five months and subsequently formed a strong attachment to his nurse at an orphanage. The nurse, Mary-Ann, left the institution to be married when Reggie was two years and eight months old. Burlingham and Freud report:

He was completely lost and desperate after her departure, and refused to look at her when she visited him a fortnight later. He turned his head to the other side when she spoke to him, but stared at the door, which had closed behind her, after she had left the room. In the evening in bed he sat up and said: "My very own Mary-Ann! But I don't like her." (pp. 15-16)

Scheff and Retzinger characterize Reggie's cutoff of Mary-Ann as a "self-inflicted wound in response to a wounding social environment. Since one has suffered from separation in the past, one protects oneself by giving up hope, producing a self-perpetuating system" (p. 16).

Pollock (1961) offers useful insights from biology that help illuminate the special function of mourning in animals and humans. Homeostasis in organisms, which refers to those processes that work toward reestablishing or maintaining steady states of equilibrium and stability in the face of external disturbances, is particularly valuable. When homeostasis does not occur, there is danger to the survival of the organism. When homeostasis works, the organism is successfully adapting to stresses and enhancing its prospects for survival. Drawing on Charles Darwin's works, Pollock (1961) points out that less-well-adapted forms of life have higher than average death rates and a lower multiplication rate. Thus, in his signature essay entitled "Mourning and Adaptation," Pollock (1961), writes:

When an object relationship is interrupted by the death of one of the significant participants, a new ego-adaptive process has to be instituted in order to deal with

the altered internal-external psychological situation. Where there is a possibility of substitution with little difficulty, the adaptive task may be easily accomplished, as in the case of certain animals and very young infants. But when the lost object has taken on psychic significance in addition to functional fulfillment, the adaptive process involves in part an undoing of the previous adaptational equilibrium established with that object, and the gradual reestablishment of new relationships with reality-present figures. The complex adaptive process instituted in such a situation is called mourning. (p. 343)

Mourning is thus an "obligatory" process—human beings do not have the choice not to mourn. It is an activity automatically set into motion by a significant loss by the organic impulse to restore equilibrium within the psychological world and also with the external environment. Regarding healthy, adaptive mourning, Pollock (1961) says that the

ego's ability to perceive the reality of the loss; to acknowledge the significance of the loss; to be able to deal with the acute sudden disruption following the loss with attendant fears of weakness, helplessness, frustration, rage, pain, and anger; to be able effectively to reinvest new objects *or ideals* (emphasis mine) with energy, and so re-establish different but satisfactory relationships are the key factors in the process. . . . Pathological interferences with it result in maladaptations with resultant psychopathology. (p. 355)

The task at this point in the essay is to make the transition from the individual self to the group self and the application of mourning theory to the group self as a necessary preliminary step to understanding mobilization (of the group self) for nationalism.

MOURNING AND THE GROUP SELF

Volkan (1965) presents a persuasive explanation of the evolution of the individual's identification with the larger group, ethnos or nation, during the adolescent developmental phase. Here the separation and individuation process brings the individual to move beyond his immediate family's definitions of who he (or she) is and where he (or she) belongs to identifying with peer group views and values. Volkan writes:

As his horizons expand beyond his family and neighborhood, the adolescent observes the world at large from a new point of view. The familiar flag, food, language, skin color, etc., continue to provide material outside for externalization, but there now appear more abstract internalizations and conceptualizations

infused with affect, such as ethnicity and nationality. . . . Although ego identities differ from individual to individual within the group, its members share the same good and bad targets, and it is these that “glue” them together. (p. 240)

Volkan’s references to internalizations, externalizations, and good and bad targets relate to the psychological boundaries that define the individual and the group self. People and nations define who they are, in part, by who they are not. We think of ourselves as “good” and “others” as not quite so good—if not downright bad, uncivilized, or even “not human.” We tend to externalize to suitable “targets”—other people, tribes or nations—unattractive aspects of ourselves and to internalize, or give ourselves full credit for, the best real or perceived aspects of ourselves. Erik Erikson (1969) used his concept of *pseudo speciation* to describe the phenomenon of tribes and nations’ self-ascribed superiority in comparison to their neighbors, other tribes, or nations:

While man is obviously one species, he appears and continues on the scene split up into groups (from tribes to nations, from castes to classes, from religions to ideologies) which provide their members with a firm sense of distinct and superior identity—and immortality. This demands, however, that each group must invent for itself a place and a moment in the very centre of the universe where and when an especially provident deity caused it to be created superior to all others, the mere mortals. (p. 431)

Somewhat mordantly, Erikson was describing a normal and natural psychological process that individuals and identity groups use to protect themselves from the mostly unconscious terror of dying and death that most human beings share. A strong and secure self-concept helps us to feel safe and in reasonable control of our fate on earth. Individuals, tribes, and nations work hard to reinforce their sense of uniqueness in the universe, and we show noteworthy anxiety about our safety and security when this sense is shaken. Pollock (1975), in his essay “Mourning, Immortality and Utopia,” quotes Ross (1968) as saying that “the need for religious faith, of whatever form or variety, is based upon the dread of object loss. . . . Religious phenomena represent projections of the need for the sustained, external existence of an immutably, protective loving object” (pp. 341–42).

Thus, as infants and children, we invest directly and emotionally in our mothers, fathers, or other primary caretakers, in exchange for feelings of safety and security. As adults, many people invest in God or some higher power that they may prefer to define in terms other than God. For yet others

for whom, in the twentieth century, God has left the heavens, there may be a continual sense of existential anxiety and loneliness.

It is into this psychological setting that we introduce the concept of political victimhood to understand how individuals and nations respond to assaults on their “superior” self-concept. These assaults may consist of persistent insults to their self-esteem by neighbors, other tribes or nations, sustained over long periods of time. They may also be violent, traumatic attacks that destroy the fragile sense of security that peoples nourish in their collective minds. Or they may be combinations of insidious insult and physical aggression. Both phenomena cause a painful sense of loss in the group. And both produce aspects of grief previously discussed—shock, rage, disbelief, despair, or depressive apathy.

Gaylin (1976) has described the depressive effect of the loss of self-esteem in the individual as a sense of despair in everyday life:

It is a humiliating, debasing feeling, and a dangerous one. It sees one abandoned and alienated from supporting love, uncherished and unwanted; it abounds with anger, resentment, and a sense of alienation and isolation. . . . This deprivation may be tolerable if there is some pathway to . . . approval. When the path is barred . . . despair can ensue, with its concomitant angers and self-destructive rage. It can lead to the destruction of self via drugs or despair, or the destruction of others through the rage of impotence and frustration. (pp. 162–63)

This description of the bereaved individual whose self-concept has been deeply undermined is the key to understanding the collective rage of nations. We now examine the mobilization for nationalism in two countries where the attempts to repair their self-concept, wounded severely in the rough and tumble of historic experience, resulted in both internalized and externalized political violence. The cases are Russia and Germany. As we know too well, the violence that these two nations generated, particularly during their Soviet and Nazi periods, resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of human beings.

THE WOUNDED GROUP SELF AND MOBILIZATION FOR NATIONALISM

Self-consciousness is a key concept in comprehending the effects of disrespect and insult in the individual and identity group. It helps us to understand how wounding—psychological or physical—affects us and precipitates rage. It is an intriguing challenge (after Suttie) to consider rage to be the anguished demand for recognition, acceptance, and respect.

However, if this explanation works, it offers an entirely new tool for the illumination of motives in the history of intergroup and international conflict.

In an impressive theoretical contribution to the discussion of the origins of violence, Scheff and Retzinger (1991) explain the importance of self-consciousness and the self-concept in interpersonal and intergroup relations. In proposing that human consciousness is social in that humans spend much of their lives living in the minds of others, the authors cite Cooley (1902) who writes with a commonsense persuasiveness:

As is the case with other feelings, we do not think much of it (that is, of social self-feeling) so long as it is moderately and regularly gratified. Many people of balanced mind and congenial activity scarcely know that they care what others think of them, and will deny, perhaps with indignation, that such care is an important factor in what they are and do. But this is illusion. If failure or disgrace arrives, if one suddenly finds that the faces of men show coldness of contempt instead of the kindness and deference that he is used to, he will perceive from the shock, the fear, the sense of being outcast and helpless, that he was living in the minds of others without knowing it, just as we daily walk the solid ground without thinking how it bears us up. (p. 208)

Liah Greenfeld's (1992) *Nationalism*, a historical, sociocultural narrative on the evolution of national self-consciousness in England, France, Russia, Germany and the United States, is a rich source of data on the issues of narcissistic wounding and rage—and complicated mourning—although the author shows almost no explicit knowledge of the psychodynamic processes that her scholarship reveals. Greenfeld makes a strong case for the emergence of national self-consciousness as a response of educated, but not “noble,” individuals to the denial of status (or prestigious selfhood) in feudal aristocracies. Identification with the nation became the psychological vehicle for claims by the intelligentsia to importance and respect. The author makes much creative analytical use of the idea of *ressentiment*—literally, resentment—as the driving collective passion in the mobilization of nationalism for international competition, conflict, and eventually, as we will see, epochal violence and war.

Writing of France, Greenfeld notes that in the mid-eighteenth century after France had lost to England the leadership position it had held in the seventeenth century, France's elites burned with desire to restore to the nation the superior status it had held and to win back its glory (see Greenfeld, 1992, p. 178). (It is interesting to recall the importance of “la

gloire” to Charles DeGaulle as he constructed the Fifth French Republic during his presidency [1959–1969].)

With the resentment theme established, we turn to Russia and then Germany to document the historical process of the wounding of the group self-concept, the uncompleted mourning of the loss incurred, and finally the subsequent narcissistic rage that was then manipulated by destructive, charismatic leaders (Volkan, 1988) and then mobilized in nationalistic violence, internal and external.

Russia

We start with Peter the Great (1672–1725) who built his capital on a European sea and fought to win the recognition and respect of the West, which he perceived to be arrogant and superior. A complete autocrat ruling an enslaved population, Peter nevertheless came to speak with feeling of “the people” of Russia and of the injuries to Russia. He spoke also of Russia as a “state.” Catherine the Great (1729–1796), a student of Montesquieu, worked to convince the Russian nobility of her accomplishments, which contributed to Russia's prestige in the international community. She succeeded, indeed, in making Russia respectable to the rulers of French public opinion.

But after the Petrine enthusiasm for Russia's place in European civilization, in the minds of literate Russians reality began to sink in that they might not after all measure up in the minds of others. In 1763, a poet wrote a Russian critical self-reflection: “Overseas [in the West], respectable scholars . . . never cling to old superstitions. . . . Scribes are not cheating . . . contracts are honored . . . honorable people . . . do not ruin simple people” (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 228).

But the unalloyed admiration for the advanced, overseas West, was not the only response of Russian intellectuals to the challenge of building a national self-concept of which they could be proud. Some worked hard to promote the virtues of native Russian culture. The Russian language became the vehicle and eventually the virtue of this movement. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, there were two languages in Russia: (1) Church-Slavonic that was available to a small minority and (2) a rough, demotic Russian that was not yet able to accommodate new philosophical, political, and social concepts and ideas drifting eastward from the West. Two scholars, Trediakovski and Lomonosov, are credited with the enrichment and adaptation of the Russian language to the challenges it faced from its European neighbors.

Trediakovski wrote of the natural superiority of the Slavonic language over the Teutonic and stated that, unlike German or French, Church-Slavonic was a language of the spirit. Lomonosov, in his *Russian Grammar* (published in 1755), wrote of the majesty of the Russian language, which, he said, had all the best qualities of the Spanish, French, German, Italian, Greek and Latin languages (see Greenfeld, 1992, p. 244).

With Karamzin's *History of the Russian State* (published in the early 1800s) the exemplar, historians also sought to establish a founding value for Russia in the community of nations. But the struggle between the admirers and the critics of the West dominated discourse in St. Petersburg and elsewhere in the Russian Empire. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, response to self-criticism among Russians about their inadequacy became defensive. The first targets of the "nationalist" critics were those Russians who remained unabashed admirers of the West. Then the attacks were made directly against the source of humiliation by comparison. According to Greenfeld (1992), "this attitude was that of undisguised and unreasoning hatred. The reaction was akin to that of a wounded beast, blinded by pain and moved by the desire to hurt back" (p. 252).

Dostoevski, working as a journalist during the 1876-1878 "Eastern Crisis," denounced Western Russophobia (Doder, 1984):

At present the most advanced states are fervently disseminating perfect absurdities about Russia. . . . Let them in their blind wrath say all these things. For it goes without saying that they would be eager to incite hatred against us everywhere abroad as against "dangerous enemies of their civilization." . . . But why this hatred against us? . . . The main reason is they are altogether unable to recognize us as theirs. . . . They consider us alien to their civilization, they regard us as strangers and imposters, as Asiatics and barbarians. (p. A25)

In the end, Russia could not disentangle itself from its fateful battle with Europe for respect and esteem. Greenfeld (1992) writes that "Russians looked at themselves through glasses fashioned in the West—they thought through the eyes of the West—and its approbation was the *sine qua non* for their national self-esteem. The West was superior; they thought it looked down on them" (p. 254).

As Gaylin (1976) has explained (above), it is psychologically unbearable to be permanently despised and rejected, whether as a person or a people, and the Russians would not accept their devaluation in the eyes of others. The ultimate response to the challenge of the West came to be Russia's rejection of it as evil. Because the Western standards of liberty

and equality were the most unobtainable in Russia and because both characteristics rested on rationality, Russian intellectuals came to reject rationality and to praise the enigmatic Slavic soul. "Reason as a faculty of the human mind referred to articulation, precision, delimitation, and reserve—they opposed it to life so full of feeling that one could choke on it" (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 256).

As Russia entered the twentieth century, a Hungarian historian summed up the great nation's ambiguity and agony over its self-concept and its identity. Tibor Szamuely (1974), in *The Russian Tradition*, wrote:

In no other country did the intellectuals, almost to a man, pass their lives in tortured reflections on their people's past and in apprehensive speculation as to its future. They knew their story to have been somber and tragic—they knew it to be essentially different from that of Europe. . . . The famous "Russian soul" was to no small extent the product of this agonizing uncertainty regarding Russia's proper geographical, social, and spiritual position in the world, the awareness of a national personality that was split between East and West. (p. 8)

The ultimate Russian rejection of the West was, of course, the Bolshevik Revolution and the determination of its authors to reconstruct the world of truth and social justice after having destroyed the corrupt Russian imperial social system and all of its Western pretensions. The Bolshevik mobilization for nationalism—despite its "internationalist" facade—was the final and most extreme response to the perceived unending insults to the collective Russian self flowing from the West.

In the name of rejection and reinvention of the model social system for all of mankind, the Bolshevism of Lenin and Stalin killed millions of its own people and imposed a brutal imperium on its immediate neighbors from 1940 to the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989. The violence unleashed by its inability to mourn its hated, lost self had incalculable costs in human suffering. Those in the West who know and care about Russia's postcommunist reconstruction focus today with intensity on conveying the message of recognition (of Russia in its historic glory and greatness), acceptance (of its need to redefine itself in the post-Soviet era), and respect (of its struggle to reconstruct a selfhood worthy of its people).

Germany

Hitler accepted the Russians' invitation to revenge. He mobilized a German nation indeed enraged, among many other things, by the humiliation of the Versailles Treaty. And the Slavic-Tatar Russians, whom the

pathologically racist führer despised, destroyed his army at Stalingrad. But the struggle of Germans to gain respect as a nation in the eyes of European "others"—and especially a benighted French nation that was destined to pay a heavy price for its role as the standard setter of civilization—began in earnest at the dawn of the nineteenth century.

French insults to German selfhood had been a matter of record well before the Revolution of 1789. Joachim Campe had written of the "shrill chattering dandies, the arrogant and brainless swaggerers who used to cross the Rhine and turn up their noses at everything they saw in Germany" (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 355). But Napoleon's defeat of Prussia in 1806 in the French revolutionary wars stung the German nobility and middle class intelligentsia into a new concept of a nation in defense of its identity—and survival. The Prussian leader Karl von Stein wrote: "I have but one fatherland and that is Germany . . . my desire is that Germany shall grow large and strong, so that it may recover its independence and nationality" (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 361). Friedrich Schlegel and Johann Gottlieb Fichte wrote with romantic passion of the individual who existed meaningfully only in terms of his bonding with the nation and, through his nation, with the whole human race.

Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote with the sensibility of the wounded, saying, "There is perhaps no other country that deserves to be free and independent as Germany, because none is so disposed to devote its freedom so single-mindedly to the welfare of all" (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 276). Conscious racial superiority had been established as a theme in German political philosophy. Fichte, for example, warned that unless the German idea of civilization endured throughout the world, the Turks, Negroes, and American tribes would dominate.

As in Russia before, intellectuals and political leaders put great emphasis on the purity, originality, and spiritual quality of the German language. There was also romantic praise in the abstract of the "people," especially the pure and virtuous *Volk*. An ominous precursor in German passions that responded to the humiliation of foreign invasion was the glorification of war as the ultimate creator of a nation's character and shaper of its destiny. Peace was seen as death and rotting. Clausewitz argued that war was a tool of politics. After allied European forces defeated Napoleon, Max von Schenkendorf wrote that "Germany needs a war of her own. She needs a private war with France in order to achieve her nationality" (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 370).

As in Russia, an earlier, almost unabashed admiration for French enlightenment gave way to an outraged rejection of a disdainful France

whose Mirabeau had told Germans that their brains were petrified by slavery. German scholars came to scorn French culture as unnatural and artificial, imitative of classical antiquity. During and after the liberation, leaders unburdened themselves of a pure hatred. Karl von Stein wrote: "In no history does one find such immorality, such moral uncleanness, as in that of France." And toward the end of his life, he wrote: "I hate the French as cordially as a Christian may hate anyone." Arndt wrote: "I hate all Frenchmen without distinction in the name of God and of my people, I teach this hatred to my son, I teach it to the sons of my people. . . . I shall work all my life that the contempt and hatred for this people strike the deepest roots in German hearts" (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 376).

Unlike Russians who could angrily reject the insulting West, celebrate their Slavic glory, and, in extreme cases, their "Asiatic savagery," Germans could not separate themselves from the West, of which they saw themselves as the purest manifestation. This may explain, in part, the special appeal of anti-Semitism in Germany. Jews were a convenient and available target for the externalization of collective self-loathing.

While vilification and oppression of Jews was centuries old throughout all of Christian Europe, it had a strong resonance in Germany, highlighted by Martin Luther's lead in public disrespect of Jews. In the eighteenth century, Herder referred to Jews in Europe as an Asiatic people foreign to the continent. Fichte, with breathtaking viciousness, wrote in 1793: "The only way I can see to give the Jews civil rights is to cut off their heads in a single night and equip them with new ones devoid of every Jewish idea" (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 383).

There is no need to elaborate on this history of human tragedy in Europe, as ethnic groups and nations struggled to preserve, discover, affirm, or defend their selfhood and identity—indeed, their very sense of personal safety and security. Erik Erikson (1959), trying to explain the appeal of Hitler's calls for German unity and *Lebensraum*, wrote of the enduring sense of vulnerability to invasion from the wide diversity of cultures surrounding them. He said that the world

persistently underestimated the desperate German need for unity which, indeed, cannot be appreciated by peoples who in their own land take such unity for granted. The world is apt once more to underestimate the force with which the question of national unity may become a matter of the *preservation of identity* [italics in the original], and thus a matter of (human) life and death, far surpassing the question of political systems. (p. 347)

CONCLUSION

When Erikson (who was perhaps the twentieth century's most profound student of human idiosyncrasy—and potential for improvement) warned of the world's ability to underestimate the power of ethnic identity issues, the Croatian genocide of Serbs was only a few years past. The human tragedy today is that knowledge of the need of the individual and group for recognition, acceptance, and respect—those iron laws of human nature—is so rare and affects so little the international community's guidelines for the conduct of political relations. Otherwise, the Serb anxiety for survival so effectively exploited by demagogues would have energized a peacemaking diplomacy once the public rhetoric of Serbian victimhood began to surface in the mid-1980s.

Similarly, a preventive diplomacy spurred by a system of early warning indicators psychologically sensitive to the language of selfhood and identity under threat, would have sent peacemakers to Armenia, Azerbaijan and other troubled and ethnically diverse regions of the former Soviet Union, and to Africa. This is another subject that I have discussed elsewhere (Montville, 1993a, 1993b, 1994). The principal point of this chapter is that the wounded group self, the people or nation that feels despised, is in a state of uncompleted mourning for a lost sense, not so much of dignity, but of its ability to thrive and survive. Erikson was absolutely correct to say that it was a matter of life and death. The body count in greater Russia, Germany, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and other places are the devastating evidence of this truth.

A wounded people is thus dangerous and potentially destructive to either itself or others, against whom its rage is directed. A scientifically informed peacemaking will seek to figuratively and literally revisit those moments in history when the wounds and losses to group self-concept occurred and will attempt to reactivate the mourning process to a point of reasonable completion. And at that moment, the people or nation will become able to trust again in its relationships with former enemies and to regain some faith in its future.

It is normal and scientifically predictable that different communities that live close to each other will have ambiguous feelings about each other. They might be positive, even playfully competitive. But under various forms of stress, the feelings can be negative and destructive. As we have seen throughout this chapter, confusion and uncertainty about the true worth of one's own group or collective self can be projected as contempt or hatred toward the other group. Influential leaders may work toward reconciliation of the communities or alternatively can fan the

hatred through a xenophobia with great potential for violence. Outsiders might work vigorously to promote resolution of the conflict. Or, as in the Yugoslav tragedy, they may stand aside and watch. If they do the latter, they must bear a great burden of moral responsibility for the deaths of innocents.